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Abstract 
 
Counterfactual thinking (CFT; mentally simulating alternatives to reality) is central to learning 
and motivation. Two studies explored the relationship between CFT and fantasy proneness, a 
personality trait typified by excessive fantasies hard to distinguish from reality. In study 1, 
participants completed a fictional diary entry which was used to measure spontaneous CFT and 
the Creative Experiences Questionnaire measure of fantasy proneness. Fantasy proneness was 
significantly correlated with the generation of counterfactual thoughts. Both CFT and fantasy 
proneness have been independently associated with low mood and study 2 included a measure 
of negative emotional state (the Depression, Anxiety and Stress scale) in addition to the CEQ 
and CFT.  Fantasy proneness and negative emotion both predicted CFT, but no interaction 
between them was observed. The results suggest that individuals high in fantasy proneness 
have a general tendency to think counterfactually.  
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1. Introduction 
Counterfactual thinking (CFT) refers to the mental simulation of alternatives to reality. It takes 
the form of “if only …” thoughts about what might have been. For example, a person might 
imagine “if only I had gone to university, I could have pursued a different career.” The 
tendency for people to imagine events beyond those that actually occurred is a pervasive 
feature of human thought (Byrne, 2002). It occurs across cultures, even in the absence of 
linguistic cues (Au, 1983) and at pre-school age, children can already draw conclusions about 
what might have happened if antecedent events had been different (Harris, German & Mills, 
1996). A range of emotions including guilt and shame (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 
1994), sympathy and blame (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell & Davis, 2008), regret (Seta & Seta, in 
press) and relief (Sweeny & Vohs, 2012) are associated with imagining that events could have 
turned out differently. 
 
Our understanding of CFT is critical because reflecting on what might have been facilitates 
important psychological functions which impact on behaviour and wellbeing (Epstude & Roese, 
2008; Roese & Morrison, 2009). Functions may be affective, for instance contrasting the 
current situation with less desired states can enhance mood (Sanna, 2000), or preparative, such 
as when mental simulations of better realities support improved future outcomes (Roese, 1997). 
Counterfactuals highlight causal relations (Walsh & Byrne, 2007) and are hence a means by 
which individuals can learn from past mistakes, plan ahead and modify behaviour (Markman, 
Gavanski, Sherman & McMullen, 1993; Smallman & Roese, 2009). In relation to specific goals, 
CFT can improve motivation, encourage persistence and model success through a process of 
reflection and evaluation of alternative states (Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008) or as a 
function of regret (Seta & Seta, in press). In sum, this functional explanation suggests that 
counterfactual simulation can be an antecedent of performance, with behavioural regulation 
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serving to avoid undesirable outcomes, or promote desirable ones, in the future (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008). Accordingly, understanding how individual differences influence CFT has 
important implications for learning and personal development. 
 
Surprisingly little is known about how personality influences CFT and it is this which forms the 
focus of the present studies. Roese (1997) identified two stages of counterfactual generation: 
Activation (whether counterfactuals actually come to mind) and functional content (what these 
thoughts focus on). Research on activation has mainly concentrated on understanding the 
situational and emotional contexts which trigger CFT. For instance, individuals generate more 
counterfactuals following negative outcomes (Roese & Hur, 1997) and when in a low mood, 
whether naturally occurring (Monroe, Skowronski, MacDonald & Wood, 2005) or induced 
(Sanna, Turley-Ames & Meier 1999).  However, far less research has examined personality 
correlates of activation. Kasimatis and Wells (1995) presented a series of studies which 
demonstrated little relation between CFT activation and a range of personality factors including 
the Big Five, need for cognition and locus of control. Variations were only observed when 
counterfactuals were examined for functional content. Later work has also linked personality 
and counterfactual content - for example, optimists and individuals high in self-esteem are 
more likely to think about how things could have turned out worse (Sanna, 2000; Sanna, et al 
1999) and Wong, Haselhuhn and Kray (2012) have shown that individuals who perceive 
cognitive abilities as malleable were more likely to consider how things could have been better 
(as opposed to worse) when reflecting on previous experience.   
 
The present work concentrates on a personality factor not previously considered in the context 
of CFT, fantasy proneness, and specifically on how this may impact on the activation of 
counterfactuals. Individuals high in fantasy proneness tend to spend considerable amounts of 
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time daydreaming (Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009) and experience ‘‘deep, profound, and long-
standing involvement in fantasy and imagination” (Lynn & Rhue, 1988, p. 35). Such 
individuals may have fantasies and pseudomemories so vivid that they can be hard to 
distinguish from reality (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van Breukelen & Wessel, 2004; 
Merckelbach, 2004; Merckelbach, Horselenberg & Muris, 2001). Fantasy proneness can be 
seen as normally distributed within the general population (Eisen & Lynn, 2001) with various 
degrees of daydreaming a fairly universal part of normal emotional functioning (Mason, Norton, 
Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007). Importantly, being prone to fantasy is not the 
same as being prone to CFT. CFT involves the simulation of alternative outcomes to actual life 
events, but tend to involve minimal changes to those events (Byrne, 2002). Fantasy proneness 
however, is conceptualised as the tendency to imagine fictitious situations, often to escape 
reality. What the concepts share is a tendency to mentally construct alternative realities.  As 
such, we might reasonably expect that individuals high in fantasy proneness will also have a 
tendency towards the spontaneous activation of counterfactual thoughts.  
 
Much previous research has measured cued CFT, whereby participants are explicitly asked to 
state ways in which a given situation might have turned out differently, for better and worse. 
While these tasks can present a rich source of data on counterfactual content, a more sensitive 
measure of the general propensity to engage in CFT can be achieved by examining a free 
narrative response within which counterfactual thoughts are spontaneously embedded 
(McEleney & Byrne, 2006; Sanna & Turley, 1996).  As our interest was in the natural 
propensity to CFT, we examined the number of counterfactuals that participants spontaneously 
generated in a fictional diary entry (McEleney & Byrne, 2006). We also presented a self-report 
measure of fantasy proneness and expected that scores on this measure would significantly 
predict the tendency to generate counterfactuals.  
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2. Experiment 1 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants 
A volunteer sample of 106 undergraduate students (80 female; mean age 26.56 years, SD = 
12.22) participated in small groups. All were native English speakers.  
 
 
2.1.2  Measures and Procedures 
All participants completed two measures: 
Counterfactual thinking: Participants read a scenario about moving house to a new job in a new 
city (from McEleney & Byrne, 2006). The scenario described a number of decisions made and 
events that occurred in the first few weeks after the move which resulted in difficulties settling 
in and making new friends. Participants were given 5 minutes to write a free narrative of their 
thoughts and feelings in the style of a personal diary entry and we counted the number of 
counterfactuals generated in each narrative. A counterfactual was defined as any thought about 
how a change to the scenario would change the outcome (McEleney & Byrne, 2006; for 
instance, ‘‘If only I had gone to that party, I would have made friends”).  Participants typically 
generate between 0 and 4 counterfactuals in response to this scenario (McEleney & Byrne, 
2006, present a mean of 1.75).  
 
The Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ: Merckelbach et al., 2001) is a dichotomous 
measure of fantasy proneness comprising 25 items, for example, “My fantasies are so vivid that 
they are like a good movie”. “Yes” responses were summed to yield a total CEQ score with 
good internal consistency (α = .82). 
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2.2 Results 
The mean number of counterfactuals (M = 1.56; SD = 1.61) was fairly typical for this task (e.g. 
McEleney & Byrne, 2006). CEQ scores (M = 9.69, SD = 4.76) were within the expected range 
for a non-clinical sample (Merckelbach et al., 2001). As predicted, scores on this fantasy 
proneness measure were positively correlated with number of counterfactuals generated (r 
= .55, p < .01, ² = .30).  
 
2.3 Discussion 
As predicted, Experiment 1 showed that higher levels of fantasy proneness were correlated with 
higher levels of spontaneous CFT. This is one of the first studies to show a significant 
association between a specific personality trait and individual differences in the activation of 
counterfactuals.  
 
However, as noted earlier, individuals with low mood show a propensity to think 
counterfactually (Monroe, et al., 2005; Sanna et al., 1999) and one of the key affective 
functions of CFT is to regulate emotion (Sanna, 2000). Fantasy proneness has also been 
associated with subclinical levels of mood disorder (Levin & Spei, 2003; Maaranen, Tanskanen, 
Honkalampi, Haatainen, Hintikka, & Viinamäki, 2005) and schizotypy (Merckelbach & 
Giesbrecht, 2006) and, in clinical populations, an association with schizophrenia, dissociation, 
depression and anxiety is documented (Ross, Joshi & Currie, 1990; Tutkun, Sar, Yargic, 
Ozpulat, Yanik, & Kiziltan, 1998). Accordingly, it is possible that the relationship between 
fantasy proneness and CFT may be based on their mutual association with low mood, a factor 
not considered in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, therefore, we presented the same CFT and 
fantasy proneness measures as previously, together with a measure of mood state. We expected 
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to replicate the relationship between fantasy proneness and CFT found in Experiment 1. In 
addition, we predicted that both fantasy proneness and CFT would be positively correlated with 
negative mood. Finally, we aimed to investigate whether mood would mediate the association 
between fantasy proneness and CFT.   
 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
A volunteer sample of 76 students (52 female; mean age 27.85 years, SD =8.69) participated in 
small groups. All were native English speakers and self-declared as not having been clinically 
diagnosed with any form of psychological disorder, including depression and anxiety. None 
had taken part in Experiment 1. 
 
3.1.2 Measures and Procedures 
Counterfactual Thinking: All participants completed the same task as in Experiment 1 and 
counterfactuals were identified according to the same criteria. Two raters independently 
examined the diary narratives (inter-rater reliability, r =.86) 
 
Following this, participants completed the CEQ (α = .78 for this sample) and finally the 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).The DASS 
comprises three 7-item scales to measure the negative emotional states of depression, anxiety 
and stress. It has a robust factor structure and high levels of reliability with non-clinical 
samples (Crawford & Henry, 2003). Items present descriptions of affective symptoms, for 
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example:  ‘‘I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all” (depression), ‘‘I was 
worried about situations where I might panic and make a fool of myself” (anxiety), and ‘‘I 
found it hard to wind down” (stress). Participants rated the extent to which they have 
experienced each symptom over the past week on a scale from 0 - not at all to 3 - most of the 
time. Scores for each emotional state were computed by summing responses from the items in 
each subscale and multiplying by 2 – hence maximum score for each scale was 421. Each scale 
showed good internal consistency (depression α = .92, anxiety α = .85, stress α = .86). 
 
3.2 Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The mean number of counterfactuals observed was again 
characteristic of responses to this scenario (McEleney & Byrne, 2006) and similar to 
Experiment 1. Scores on the DASS subscales showed typical intercorrelations for this measure 
(depression*anxiety, r = .52; depression*stress r = .54; anxiety* stress r = .84; p < .01 in each 
case) and, following Lovibond & Lovibond (1995), we computed the mean of the three scores 
to produce a composite measure of negative emotional state (NES).  Table 1 shows the mean 
scores for this and the CEQ. Both were typical of those reported previously for non-clinical 
samples (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Merckelbach et al., 2001, respectively).   
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Both NES and CEQ scores correlated positively with CFT as shown in Table 1. In addition, 
NES and CEQ were themselves moderately, but significantly, related (r = .26, p = .03; 2 tailed) 
suggesting that participants who reported low mood were also likely to be higher in fantasy 
proneness. 
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A linear regression analysis showed that, as expected, fantasy proneness significantly predicted 
CFT (model 1 in Table 2). A series of further regressions were then conducted to test whether 
mood would mediate this effect. Baron and Kenny (1986) specified four requirements for 
mediation: 1) the predictor significantly predicts the outcome in the absence of the mediator; 2) 
the mediator has a significant unique effect on outcome; 3) the predictor significantly predicts 
the mediator; 4) on addition of the mediator to the model, the effect of the predictor on the 
outcome is reduced. In Table 2, the first two of these criteria are satisfied in models 1 and 2 in 
that the predictor (fantasy proneness) and the mediator (NES) are both significant independent 
predictors of CFT (CEQ and NES both converted to z-scores). Model 3 shows that fantasy 
proneness predicts NES.  
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, both fantasy proneness and NES were entered into model 4. As Table 2 shows, 
significantly more of the overall variance in CFT was accounted for compared to model 1: R² 
change = .42, F change (2, 73) = 25.96, p < .001. The effect of fantasy proneness was reduced 
when NES was included in the model (as evidenced by the reduced beta value compared to 
model 1) suggesting a partial mediating effect. As recommended for small samples, we used 
nonparametric bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) to test the mediational effect 
of NES on the relationship between fantasy proneness and CFT.  Results based on 10,000 
bootstrapped samples indicated a 95% confidence interval which included zero (lower CI=.00; 
upper CI= .05). This suggests an indirect effect not significantly different from zero (p < .05, 
two tailed), and hence that no significant mediating effects are present.  
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An alternative possibility is that the results of model 4 reflect a partial moderating effect such 
that the effect of fantasy proneness on CFT varies with different levels of NES. To test for this, 
we conducted a final regression (Table 2, model 5) which incorporated an interaction variable 
(computed as the product of CFT and NES scores).  Model 5 accounted for the same amount of 
variance in CFT as model 4 (40%). Fantasy proneness and NES remained significant predictors, 
with β values identical to those in model 4, but the interaction variable did not predict CFT, 
suggesting no significant moderating effects.  
 
4. General Discussion 
These studies provide one of the first demonstrations that personality factors can predict the 
extent to which individuals engage in spontaneous counterfactual thinking. In study 1 we 
showed that fantasy proneness significantly predicted the activation of counterfactual thoughts 
with high fantasisers generating more counterfactuals than low fantasisers. Low mood has been 
associated with both fantasy proneness (Levin & Spei, 2003; Maaranen, et al., 2005) and CFT 
(Monroe, et al., 2005) and the results of study 2 were consistent with previous research in these 
respects. However, our data suggested no interaction between fantasy proneness and mood in 
the activation of counterfactuals. This was perhaps surprising given that, for many individuals, 
negative events are inextricably linked to some degree of lowered mood and this is thought to 
be a key activator of CFT. Indeed, CFT has been described as a spontaneous, possibly 
automatic process, almost irrepressible following a negative event or perceived poor decision 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008).  Fantasy proneness has also been linked to low mood states in non-
clinical populations (Levin & Spei, 2003; Maaranen, et al., 2005) and we might therefore have 
expected that participants activating the most counterfactuals would be those high in fantasy 
proneness, but low in mood. One possible way in which the three factors may interact is via 
rumination. Thinking repetitively, but passively, about distressing events and focusing on 
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negative emotions is linked to higher levels of depressive symptoms over time (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). However, CFT and rumination can be separated conceptually (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008). Whether or not it involves rumination, CFT is a stronger predictor of depression 
that rumination alone (Roese, Epstude, Fessel, et al., 2009).  
 
A practical context in which fantasy and CFT may interact is in coping with stressful events. 
Thinking counterfactually about how things might have been better may support coping by 
raising optimism and improving mood (Sanna, 2000) or facilitating problem-focused behaviour 
regulation (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Mandel, 2003; Markman & McMullen, 2003). However, 
such counterfactuals may be unhelpful if the situation is perceived to be outside the individual’s 
control (Markman & Miller, 2006; Markman & Weary, 1996) and excessive regret or negative 
emotion may be detrimental to coping (Davis & Lehman, 1995; Gilbar & Hevroni, 2007; 
Kocovski, Endler, Rector & Flett, 2005).  Fantasies support coping as a means to avoid 
unpleasant realities (Lawrence, Edwards, Barraclough, Church, & Hetherington, 1995), to 
avoid culpability (Merckelbach, 2004) or dissociate from trauma (Näring & Nijenhuis, 2005).  
Continuing research might usefully explore the nature and function of counterfactuals 
generated by high fantasisers who have not experienced major trauma and have no clinical 
psychopathology. Individual differences in how CFT and fantasy proneness interact to mutually 
support emotional regulation and affect coping is a significant issue given the link between 
poor coping and reduced physical and mental health (Wrosch, Bauer, Miller, & Lupien, 2007). 
However, there are additional, wider, implications. Smith and Mathur (2009) have shown that 
fantasy prone children not only have better coping skills and emotional regulation than their 
less imaginative peers, they also perform better on measures of thinking, logic, and 
communication. 
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Finally, given our results, it is surprising that Kasimatis and Wells (1995) reported no 
association between CFT and the Big Five factor Openness to Experience. This trait includes a 
subfacet “Fantasy” reflecting the tendency to mentally create a richer, more interesting world 
(Costa & McCrae, 2006). Furthermore, daydreaming (a major aspect of fantasy proneness) has 
been found to correlate positively with Openness when the content of the fantasies is 
constructive, but with the trait Neuroticism when the daydreams are dysphoric (Zhiyan & 
Singer, 1997). The relationship between CFT and the Big Five traits remains under-researched 
and requires further investigation.  
 
4.1 Limitations  
This work is not without limitations. Firstly, although our measures are all widely used in 
research, they may suffer from well-documented limitations associated with psychometrics and 
self-report. Secondly, an undergraduate sample may limit generalisability to a wider population 
– though it is notable that UK undergraduates are increasingly heterogeneous in social 
background and age. Thirdly, our participants were predominantly female and the association 
between variables could be driven by women’s increased tendency towards rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Aldeo, 2011). Further research with larger, gender balanced and socially 
representative, samples is desirable. Finally, this research focused only on the activation stage 
of the CFT process. A number of questions remain outstanding with regard to how individual 
differences in fantasy proneness are reflected in variations in the functional content of 
counterfactuals. We did not examine content here because, while the diary task provides a 
useful measure of spontaneous activation, the counterfactuals generated tend to vary little in 
content and structure (McEleney& Byrne, 2006). Further research might usefully employ tasks 
which cue participants to think in alternative ways or which manipulate the outcome valence of 
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the scenario. These methods produce richer variation in content data and offer a useful way to 
examine individual differences. 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
Reflection on life is a pervasive part of human experience. CFT not only facilitates learning, 
planning and behaviour change, but also allows us to find meaning in life choices and events 
(Kray, George, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Tetlock & Roese, 2010). Our preliminary studies suggest 
that individuals high in fantasy proneness also have a tendency towards CFT. The next step is 
to investigate associated differences in the content and functional application of counterfactuals.  
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Table 1: Mean scores and correlations between CFT, fantasy proneness (CEQ) and 
negative emotional state (NES).  
 
 
 
 
mean 
 
SD 
 
CFT (r) 
 
CFT 
 
1.17 
 
1.32 
 
---- 
 
CEQ 
 
9.84 
 
5.30 
 
.58** 
 
NES 
 
9.91 
 
6.19 
 
.42** 
   ** p< .01 (1 tailed) 
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Table 2: Regressions to test mediating effect of negative emotional state (NES) on 
relationship between fantasy proneness (CEQ) and CFT. 
 
 
Model 
 
Predictor 
 
Outcome 
 
Adj. 
R
2
 
 
Standardised 
β 
 
t 
 
p 
1 CEQ CFT .33 .58 6.11 < .001 
2 NES CFT .17 .42 4.00 < .001 
3 CEQ  NES .05 .26 2.26 .03 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
CEQ (step 1) 
NES (step 2) 
 
CEQ (1) 
NES (2) 
Interaction (3) 
 
CFT 
 
 
CFT 
 
 
.40 
 
 
.40 
 
 
.51 
.29 
 
.51 
.29 
-.01 
 
5.45 
3.16 
 
4.29 
3.14 
-.11 
 
< .001 
.002 
 
< .001 
.002 
.91 
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Footnote 1 
For the 21-item DASS used here, the test manual (Lovibond& Lovibond, 1995) instructs that 
scores be multiplied by 2 in order that they appear equitable to those obtained on the 42-item 
version of the measure.   
 
